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INTRODUCTION
Although the Warren Court had its share of grand decisions, per-
haps it should be known instead for its grand goals-particularly the
goals of ending America's shameful history of segregation and of pro-
viding a broad array of constitutional rights to persons accused of
committing crimes. Brown v. Board of Education' and Miranda v. Ari-
zona,2 the two most well-known decisions of the Warren Court (and
possibly the two most well-known decisions in the history of the Su-
preme Court), best capture the Court's labor in the rocky fields of our
nation's legal, political, and cultural life. In this Article, we explore
certain parallels between Brown and Miranda.3 These similarities re-
ft Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell Death Pen-
alty Project.
tt Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Assistant Director, Cornell Death Pen-
alty Project.
tt" J.D., 2004, Cornell Law School.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 This Article is not the first to explore the parallels between school desegregation
and the criminal justice system. Indeed, others have considered similarities between the
two areas in considering Brown's fiftieth anniversary. See, e.g., Catherine Beane, Separate
and Unequal, CHAMPION, May 2004, at 54. Moreover, Professor Louis Michael Seidman has
already contributed significant analysis of the parallels between Brown and Miranda in an
article discussing how both decisions were seen as subverting power relationships in society
and revolutionizing constitutional adjudication. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 673-80 (1992). He ultimately argues that both decisions
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veal the Warren Court's strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, how-
ever, both decisions reveal the Warren Court's failure to level the
playing field for America's students and its suspects. Both decisions
have failed to live up to their initial promise; their inherent flaws reso-
nate even today, serving as a constant reminder of perhaps irretriev-
ably lost progress.
Part I of this Article highlights similarities between Brown and Mi-
randa. After examining the similarities, we explore the historical sig-
nificance of these decisions in Part II. Brown and Miranda, the most
controversial Supreme Court decisions of this century, were both ef-
forts to dislodge entrenched institutional racism in American society,
and both created a significant backlash. In the end, however, both
decisions were successfully woven into our political and legal fabric,
and today neither decision is particularly controversial.
In Part III, we consider some of the reasons Brown and Miranda
were so easily integrated into American culture. We argue that
America only accepted these decisions because both contained signifi-
cant limitations on their enforcement. In other words, Brown and Mi-
randa were not ultimately accepted due to their moral authority or
logic-or even because of society's respect for the Court as the ulti-
mate arbiter of constitutional questions. Rather, each decision's re-
spective shortcomings ensured their survival. In Brown, the Court's
"all deliberate speed" remedial standard 4 allowed states to drag their
feet. In Miranda, the Court's decision to allow waivers of the right to
silence and to counsel, 5 and to permit waivers to be taken by police
officers, 6 permitted continued interrogation of suspects without the
presence of an attorney. Both decisions, despite their grand inten-
tions, symbolic statements, and constitutional imperatives, did not
were actually retreats rather than revolutions. Id. This Article explores some additional
parallels between the two decisions and reasons why both decisions failed to truly change
segregated America-particularly because both of the Court's opinions opened the door
to diluting their own effectiveness in combating racism in school systems and in police
interrogation rooms.
4 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) ("After . .. warnings have been
given, . . the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement.").
6 The Miranda decision is not clear on who must apply the "procedural safeguards"
of a warning and waiver to the suspect prior to interrogation, but if read in context, it
seems obvious that the Court contemplated that police officers would be the ones reading
rights and securing waivers of those rights. See, e.g., id. at 444 ("'By custodial interrogation,
we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers ...."); id. at 469-70 ("A mere
warning[, without further explanation,] given by the interrogators is not alone suffi-
cient . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. at 472 ("If an individual indicates that he wishes the
assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ig-
nore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a
retained attorney." (emphasis added)). It is difficult to imagine that "interrogators" or
"the authorities" under these circumstances would be anyone other than police officers.
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truly jeopardize the status quo. Although the decisions' limitations
may well have been political and institutional, and despite shortcom-
ings which have surely been augmented by major subsequent miscal-
culations, we nonetheless consider in Part III the positive
contributions of both decisions.
Finally, because the death penalty is what two of us know the most
about, and because it is an immutable fact of academic life that law
school professors cannot resist the temptation to opine about their
primary interest, in Part IV we will also discuss how the Court's 1972
decision in Furman v. Georgia,7 which invalidated all then-existing
death penalty statutes, bears many important similarities to both
Brown and Miranda.
I
THE WARREN COURT UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: JURISPRUDENTIAL
SIMILARITIES OF BROWN AND MIRANDA
Before delving more deeply, we should first point out the most
obvious similarities in the two cases. Both involved several consoli-
dated cases raising identical or closely related constitutional ques-
tions. Five different cases were decided on the same day and on the
same merits as Brown." What we now know as Miranda involved
four consolidated cases.9 This first similarity may be due to a
second similarity: in both Miranda and Brown, key actors from the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) were involved.1 0
7 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
8 See Brown v. Rd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954) (discussing the back-
grounds of each of the four cases consolidated in Brown); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (deciding a fifth case); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reflections on the First Half-
Century of Brown v. Board of Education-Part 1, CHAMPION, May 2004, at 6 (describing the
five individual cases before the Supreme Court).
9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-99 (applying the Miranda ruling individually to the
four consolidated cases).
10 SeeJACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 116-32, 152-76 (1994) (discussing
the history of the Brown litigation and the LDF's role). The LDF was not directly involved
in the litigation surrounding Miranda, but it took a leading role in fighting racial discrimi-
nation in the criminal justice system long before Miranda. See id. at 440-60. Thurgood
Marshall, in particular, played an active part in this campaign, but ironically argued the
government's position in Westover v. United States, one of the companion cases to Miranda.
See Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall's View
of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 369, 371 (1994); see also LrvA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME,
IAW ANn POLITICS 135, 145-46 (1983) (discussing Marshall's role in the Miranda appeal).
John Paul Frank, one of the lawyers who worked on the Miranda case on appeal to the
Supreme Court, however, had previously served as an advisor to Thurgood Marshall in his
school desegregation efforts. See id. at 65. Moreover, Professor Anthony Amsterdam
crafted one of the most influential amicus briefs in Miranda, which the American Civil
Liberties Union filed. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union for
Appellant, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Nos. 584, 759, 760, 761, 762); see also
Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From
Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REv. 359, 400-01 (2001) (discussing
20051
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Finally, both opinions were authored by Chief Justice Warren
himself.1
Now we move beyond the obvious. Conventional wisdom teaches
us that the Warren Court era was a time of rapid-and at times radi-
cal-change in American constitutional law. Not only did the Court,
for the first time in nearly a hundred years, become integrally in-
volved in the advancing movement to address the racial power imbal-
ance in the United States,' 2 but it did so utilizing judicial reasoning
that was novel to the contemporary court system. Brown and Miranda
each represent the Warren Court's modified method of constitutional
adjudication.
Here we will explore two of the Warren Court's hallmark ap-
proaches. The first is a willingness to promulgate rules in a legislative
or quasi-legislative manner. The second is a willingness to embrace
social science evidence and research in the constitutional debate, re-
gardless of whether the information was fully part of the Court record
or the fact that some of it was actually quite uncertain.
A. Quasi-Legislative Adjudication
Brown and Miranda are paradigmatic of the Warren Court's quasi-
legislative approach to constitutional law. The Court did not restrict
itself to identifying the constitutional error in the case before it, but
laid down broad standards to be applied across the board in all states
to all similarly situated parties.1 3
In Brown, the Court held that the mantra ofJim Crow laws and de
jure segregation-"separate but equal"-not only failed Oliver Brown,
Harry Briggs, Jr., Dorothy E. Davis, Spottswood Thomas Bolling, and
Francis B. Gebhart (the plaintiffs in each of the consolidated cases
before the Court in Brown), but also every black child in every segre-
gated school system in America. 14 At least in theory, states all around
the country were required to dismantle structural segregation and
fully integrate their schools. Similarly, in Miranda, the Court held that
interrogation without appropriate warnings regarding the rights to si-
how the Miranda Court ultimately adopted the Fifth Amendment as the ground for its
opinion, which was argued only by the ACLU in its amicus brief). Professor Amsterdam
later became a pivotal figure in the LDF, particularly in its fight against the death penalty.
See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 90 (1998).
11 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439; Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
12 See Seidman, supra note 3, at 750-51 (characterizing Brown and Miranda as the
ultimate triumphs of liberal constitutionalism that began with the Civil War and the Recon-
struction Amendments).
13 See id. at 678-79.
14 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 ("[Wle hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
(emphasis added)).
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lence and to counsel (and a valid waiver of those rights) violated the
Fifth Amendment rights not just of Ernesto Miranda, Michael
Vignera, Carl Westover, and Roy Stewart, but of all defendants in all
states where such interrogations occurred.1 5 Moreover, the Court
provided a specific, talismanic set of warnings that police must issue
prior to engaging in any custodial interrogation.' 6 Although the
Court left the door open for states and Congress to come up with
equal or better safeguards,1 7 its remedy in both cases was as legislative
in character as any remedy it had previously crafted.
Perhaps to balance the breadth of these decisions, the Court soon
"clarified" both Brown and Miranda. For Brown, the clarification came
one year later in Brown II, where the Court tempered the requirement
that states integrate schools by allowing schools to remedy segregation
with "all deliberate speed."18 In the end, "all deliberate speed" meant
that many black children in school at the time Brown was decided-
including children in kindergarten-spent their entire public school
education in segregated schools.1 9 For Miranda too, the Court deter-
mined that some delay was permissible, though the length of permissi-
ble delay was much shorter. Only a week after Miranda, the Supreme
Court decided in Johnson v. New Jersey that the Miranda protections
would only apply prospectively in cases where the "trials had not be-
gun as ofJune 13, 1966," the date of the Miranda decision. 20 In other
words, those defendants whose Fifth Amendment rights had been vio-
lated before Miranda had no recourse.
The notion that constitutional rights would be enforced when
states became able to enforce them was novel. Normally, once the
Court recognizes that some state action violates the Constitution, the
states must desist from that action, no matter the inconvenience of
immediate change.2 1 To take the most dramatic example, in Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Court did not tell states that they could gradually pro-
15 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[T] here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in
all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.").
16 See id. at 444-45.
17 See id. at 467.
18 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
19 SeeJAMEs T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATtOm A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 113 (2001) ("By early 1964, only 1.2 percent of black children in
the eleven southern states attended schools with whites. Virtually all southern black chil-
dren who had entered the first grade in 1954 and who remained in southern schools grad-
uated from all-black schools twelve years later.").
20 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-35 (1966); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 734.
21 SeeJ. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN 1o BATTY. THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INrTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 64 & n.ll (1979) ("[W]here constitutional rights
hang in the balance, the Court has often dismissed administrative convenience as an insuf-
ficient state concern.").
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vide defense counsel for indigent criminal defendants accused of seri-
ous crimes.2 2 Rather, it held that those defendants whom states had
incarcerated without having provided counsel at trial were entitled to
new trials. 23 In many cases, the passage of time since the original con-
viction made retrial impossible, and the Court's ruling resulted in re-
lease rather than retrial;24 the fact that felons would be released back
into society did not alter the constitutional mandate. Thus, the re-
stricted remedies of Brown and Miranda, as well as the breadth of the
decisions, resembled legislative balancing more than did previously
typical constitutional adjudication.
The breadth of the decisions, though obviously not their delayed
enforcement, also reflected the aspirations of the architect's underly-
ing litigation. For the LDF, using its new form of public interest law,
plaintiffs were often proxies for all similarly situated clients. 2 5 The
LDF's interest in having the cases brought was not just the personal
well-being of the individuals involved, but also systematic societal
change.2 6 Ernesto Miranda and his colleagues may have been prima-
rily interested in staying out of jail, but their lawyers definitely had
bigger fish to fry.27
Both decisions crafted these quasi-legislative mandates through
what Professor Henry Monaghan has referred to as a type of "constitu-
tional common law" where the Court moves beyond the Constitution's
explicit mandates to craft rules-often resembling statutes-that fur-
ther constitutional values.28 Though Miranda fits this construct more
than Brown, both holdings lack a clear textual basis in the Constitu-
tion, and both were designed to broaden significantly certain constitu-
tional ideals and goals. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment
merely mandates equal protection of the laws, 29 and states attempted
to meet this mandate-or at least claimed they were trying to com-
22 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
23 See Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 2-4 (1963) (vacating judgments and re-
manding cases for consideration in light of Gideon over a dissent by Justice Harlan caution-
ing the Court that applying Gideon retroactively would "require the reopening of cases
long since finally adjudicated"); Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1091, 1099 n.58.
24 See Bruce R. Jacob, Memories and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON
L. REv. 181, 222 (2003) (recounting experience compiling data, as an Assistant Attorney
General of Florida working on Gideon, that "if the new decision was ... made retroactive,
more than 4,500 of the 8,000 inmates in Florida could be released and retried, or released
without retrial").
25 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 107.
26 See id. at 126-27 (discussing the plaintiffs in the trial phase of Brown in Topeka,
Kansas).
27 See BAKER, supra note 10, at 60-66 (describing the ACLU's involvement and the
lawyers who ultimately represented Mr. Miranda before the Supreme Court).
28 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. Rev. 1,
2-3 (1975).
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ply-by creating a "separate," but nevertheless "equal" school sys-
tem.3 0  Similarly, the text of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
compelled self-incrimination,-3 and states protected this right (again,
theoretically in good faith) by barring the admission of involuntary
statements. 3 2 The Warren Court looked at both of these practices and
held that they did not fully comport with the goals and purposes of
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments in a contemporary society.
Unquestionably, a majority of the Court also believed the status quo
was inherently wrong and that the brunt of the current system fell
most heavily on minorities and the poor.3 3 Thus, drawing on some-
what vague constitutional prohibitions against discrimination and self-
incrimination, the Court intervened and attempted to rectify a nation-
wide imbalance of power.
In addition, it also seems evident that the Court employed this
quasi-legislative approach to resolve the issues Miranda and Brown
presented because the case-by-case approach it had previously utilized
had not been effective, just as the LDF and others associated with the
civil rights movement had adamantly argued. To the litigants and the
Court, the limitations of case-by-case litigation were painfully obvi-
ous.3 4 With respect to education, the Court had heard numerous
cases involving segregation in specific academic settings, such as grad-
uate and professional schools,3- and cases regarding specific instances
30 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they
are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferi-
ority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise
of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with
the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which
has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts
of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest
and most earnestly enforced.
st See U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
32 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1958) (holding that the ab-
sence of an attorney following the defendant's request for one does not render the defen-
dant's custodial confession involuntary); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1958)
(examining totality of circumstances to determine if the defendant's confession was
coerced).
33 The Court cited the Wickersham Report as justification for reining in the use of
"third degree" police interrogations. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 & n.5
(1966). This report documented numerous police abuses, especially against racial minori-
ties. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAw ENFORCEMENT 158-60 (1931).
34 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 58-91 (describing the many desegregation cases
brought before Brown).
'45 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (addressing
differential treatment of a black Oklahoma graduate student); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950) (mandating integration of the University of Texas law school even though a
separate law school in Texas for blacks existed); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
2005]
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of disparity in resource allocation between black and white public
schools.3 6 None of these decisions went so far as to end dejure segre-
gation, though cases in the 1950s came close.3 7 In part, the Court's
failure to overturn Plessy and mandate equality in education had to do
with political opposition at the time,38 but Brown provided a new op-
portunity-a vehicle to specifically attack the segregation of black and
white children in public school education and to establish a new
brand of equality in public education.
Similarly, Miranda grew out of a painful history of cases address-
ing gross police over-reaching in the interrogation of suspects, many
of whom were minorities. Indeed, police abuses against minority sus-
pects, especially in the former slave states, often involved staggering
and unabashed racism and injustice. One early example is Moore v.
Dempsey,"0 where black suspects were tortured until they confessed.
Later cases included Brown v. Mississippi, 40 where the Court over-
turned convictions because the suspects were whipped and beaten
(though, according to state officials, "not too much for a Negro") and
the Scottsboro cases, 41 where black defendants were railroaded
through trial and sentenced to death based on flimsy evidence of their
involvement in the rape of a white woman of dubious character.
42
The Court decided these cases on due process grounds, which re-
quired an examination of the totality of the circumstances. 43 But the
(1948) (addressing racial disparities in Oklahoma legal education); Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (addressing racial disparities with regard to Missouri law
schools).
36 See, e.g., Carter v. Sch. Bd., 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950) (addressing disparities in
high school facilities between white and black children); Corbin v. County Sch. Bd., 177
F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949) (same, with respect to high school and elementary students);
Alston v. Sch. Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (ruling that discrimination in teachers'
salaries violated the Equal Protection Clause); Blue v. Durham Pub. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp.
441 (M.D.N.C. 1951) (overturning policy of averaging expenditures on the basis of average
daily attendance and requiring equivalency, rather than adequacy, of school funding be-
tween racial groups).
37 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitu-
tional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2085-86 (2002) (discussing how,
in Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), the U.S. government for the first time
confessed that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong and the Court should overrule it).
38 See Dennis J. Hutchison, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 CEO. L.J. 1, 19-30 (1979); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 130-35 (1987) (discussing
the Court's approach to cases in the early 1950s and the sentiment among the general
public).
39 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
40 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
41 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
42 See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 11-50 (rev.
ed. 1979); Faust Rossi, The First Scottsboro Tials: A Legal Lynching, CORNELL L. F., Winter
2002, at 1-6.
43 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (holding that a confes-
sion secured through violence violates due process); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-92
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case-by-case totality standard had little effect in remedying these
abuses of power, 44 and there was simply a practical limit on how many
cases the Court could hear. Like Brown, by the time Miranda came to
the Court, it presented an opportunity to set broader standards to ad-
dress the problems the Court consistently had seen in these cases.
The police had become increasingly skillful in using psychological tac-
tics in persuading suspects to confess, 45 and state judges, who decided
whether to admit or exclude the confession, almost invariably found
such statements voluntary and admitted them into evidence. 46
Thus, Brown and Miranda both represent a different approach to
constitutional law-one that embraced broad quasi-legislative rulings
to remedy broad-based forms of constitutional injustice. Though ar-
guably not required by the Constitution's literal text, both cases cer-
tainly furthered the constitutional values at work in the Equal
Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment. At the same time, how-
ever, this type of adjudication brought with it tremendous criticism 47
and served as a fodder for numerous counterattacks on the Court.
Before exploring this further, we turn to a second similarity in the
decisions themselves.
B. Stretching the Record: The Use of Social Science and Other
Research
More than a fair number of scholars have criticized the unrelia-
bility of the social science studies that the Court referred to in Brown.
Indeed, Professor Mark Yudof has described this evidence, especially
the famous doll study cited in Brown, as "methodologically un-
sound. '48  Similarly, commentators have focused on the Miranda
(1923) (holding that mob interference in trial proceedings violates the due process rights
of defendants and sending the case back to the district court to determine if the facts
alleged constituted an interference with trial).
44 See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. Rev. 59, 94-104 (1966).
45 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("[T]he modern practice of in-
custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented.").
46 See Bettie E. Goldman, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda
Days?, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 245, 251 (1985) ("By leaving state courts with an imprecise
standard, the Supreme Court invited judges to employ their subjective preferences in the
voluntariness evaluation. The end result was judicial validation and affirmance by state
courts of confessions of questionable constitutionality.").
47 See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
85-86 (2001) (discussing how even Professor Herbert Wechsler, an opponent of segrega-
tion, had difficulty understanding the Brown Court's reasoning); WELSH S. WHITE, MI-
RANDA'S WANING PROIECTIONS 57 (2001) ("One police chief complained that the Court
had mistakenly interpreted the Constitution so as to provide 'a shield for criminals.'").
48 Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57, 70; see
also ROSEMARYJ. ERICKSON & RITAJ. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME
2005]
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Court's heavy reliance on police manuals. 49 These manuals detailed
various police interrogation tactics, such as isolating the suspect, as-
suming his guilt, lying about the evidence, and the "Mutt and Jeff"
good cop-bad cop technique. 50 The Court's use of this extra-record
evidence in its judicial reasoning demonstrates another commonality
in the two opinions. In both cases the Court found it necessary to
look beyond the historical facts, the more traditional legal arguments,
and, in some respects, the record established in the lower courts. This
expansion of the perceived traditional appellate court role could be
explained by the legislative nature of the rulings. In order to formu-
late such broad policy goals, the Court chose to rely more heavily on
evidence of a different character.
The use of this evidence to bolster a decision, however, created a
number of dangers. In Brown, the social science foundation jeopard-
ized the integrity of the Court's ultimate decision.5 1 Of course, in
hindsight, the widespread branding of inferiority that segregation had
on African-American children is obvious, but this truth was hardly
demonstrated by the doll studies. If the Court wanted to reach
outside the record, it should have taken notice of the historical fact
that racial segregation-at least when imposed upon the minority by
the majority-is always upon unequal terms. Taking note of this his-
torical generalization, however, would have required a blanket con-
demnation of segregation and not merely condemnation of
segregated schools. Perhaps such a sweeping ruling scared the Court,
but the more limited, chosen alternative-using arguably unreliable
evidence, not fully put to the test (or even testable) by fact-finders in
lower courts-provided an easy avenue to attack the Court's
conclusions.
With Miranda, a heavy reliance on indirect and circumstantial evi-
dence of improper police interrogation from police manuals similarly
placed the opinion at risk of criticism. The Court went out of its way
to point out that the police manuals it quoted were representative of
manuals found in police precincts all over the country. Not only did
the Court cite several of the leading practice guides for investigators,
COURT DECISIONS 16 (1998) (summarizing the primary criticisms of the social science re-
search that the Court cited in Brown).
49 See, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR
ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 191-92 (1988).
50 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-54 (citing, inter alia, FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); CHARLES E. O'I-iARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956)).
51 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 198 (" [Footnote 11 ] became tremendously contro-
versial, giving rise to charges that Brown was based on social science, not law."); 1. A. NEWBY,
CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION,
1954-1966, at 189-90 (1967); UROFSKY, supra note 47, at 85; Michael Heise, Brown v. Board
of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 279 (2004).
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it also noted the circulation (more than 44,000 copies) of one of the
key sources detailing police interrogation procedures. 52 This refer-
ence to circulation was necessary because there was no evidence that
any of the interrogation techniques the Court deemed so offensive
were actually employed in Miranda's case. Though the Court attempted
to explain that police investigators across the country used the tech-
niques,5 it could only do this with indirect and circumstantial evi-
dence from the allegedly commonly used police manuals.
Thus, in both Brown and Miranda, the Court stretched the record
to demonstrate the unconstitutional consequences of offensive state
action. With respect to Miranda, one might ask whether it had any
meaningful alternative. The evidence, while arguably suspect, was the
best evidence that existed at the time. Due to the secrecy of most
police interrogations, courts had very little way of knowing what actu-
ally went on behind closed doors in stationhouses across the coun-
try.5 4 The best the Court could do was draw inferences from
instruction manuals written by police officers, for police officers. With
respect to Brown, if the Court was unwilling to embrace broader gen-
eralizations about all racial segregation, then the psychological studies
were a similar, second-best option to advance the case that segregation
harmed black school children.55 The blatant disparity in funding for
minority schools provided some evidence, but standing alone it could
not adequately answer the argument that "separate but equal" could,
sometime, somewhere, satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The stud-
ies cited by the Court, flawed as they were, helped in that important
regard.
So Brown and Miranda share two unusual characteristics: a policy-
based, quasi-legislative approach to effectuating constitutional ideals
and the use of evidence in ways that stretched existing notions of
traditional legal reasoning by incorporating social science and other
information to support its decisions. These characteristics-especially
in combination-suggested a Supreme Court boldly going where no
Court had gone before. These similarities may stem at least in part
from a shared historical context and may foreshadow the eventual be-
trayal of both decisions' promise.
52 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 n.9.
53 See id. (noting that "these texts have had rather extensive use among law enforce-
ment agencies and among students of police science").
54 See Tracey Mactin, Book Review, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police
Squad Car, 70 B.U. L. REv. 543, 583 n.133 (1990).
55 See ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 48, at 16 ("The lesson of Brown was that social
science can provide factual illumination to a willing court. By using social science, the
Supreme Court suggested that the longstanding inequality of the two races was not due to
any biological traits of blacks." (citations omitted)); see also Heise, supra note 51, at 293
(["[T]he Court sought to push its psychological argument even further by framing it in
social science research.").
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BROWN AND MIRANDA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Brown directly addressed entrenched, institutional racism in
America. With Miranda, the connection to racism may not be so obvi-
ous, but it is nonetheless present. Protecting the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants at the time the Court decided Miranda was in-
extricably intertwined with issues of race. As previously noted, most of
the notorious examples of forced confessions through beatings and
torture occurred in the heavily segregated South. 56 As police interro-
gation became more sophisticated, the victims were still largely minor-
ities and the offenders were mainly white police officers. 57 Thus, it
should come as no surprise that the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund
directed the litigation in Brown and was indirectly involved with
Miranda.58
Public reaction to the decisions also underscores the decisions'
links to the state of race-relations at the time. Both opinions were
viewed (correctly) as threats to the power structure existing in the
United States. Brown attacked institutional white supremacy in the
form of public education; 59 Miranda attacked institutional white
supremacy in law enforcement.60 Thus, both decisions shifted, in
some respects, the balance of power from local and state actors to the
federal courts, which assumed the primary role of enforcing the Su-
preme Court's mandates. For that reason, both decisions were highly
offensive to conservative states' rights advocates. 61 While Brown served
56 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
57 See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conserva-
tive "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REv. 1447, 1478 (2003) ("While earlier criminal procedure
cases like Powel4 Moore, and Brown, were disguised cases about race, by the mid-1960s, many
Whites viewed the Court's decisions as overtly about race because of their association in the
public consciousness with urban riots and rising crime rates."); Seidman, supra note 3, at
678 ("Both supporters and opponents of Miranda understood that, in large measure, the
crime problem was the race problem ...
58 See supra note 10.
59 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 200 (discussing the hostile reaction to Brown by
white supremacy groups, including the National Association for the Advancement of White
People).
60 See UROFSKY, supra note 47, at 181 (stating that at Senate hearings later in 1966,
Senator Sam Ervin "declared that the Court had 'stressed individual rights' at the expense
of public safety"); WHITE, supra note 47, at 57 ("Richard Nixon ... chastised the Supreme
Court for contributing to the low conviction rate of serious criminals: [he claimed that
Miranda] 'had the effect of seriously ham stringing [sic] the peace forces in our society and
strengthening the criminal forces.'" (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 12, 936-38 (text of presiden-
tial candidate Nixon's May 8, 1968 position paper on crime)) (second alteration in
original)).
61 Public reaction to Brown demonstrated the decision's offensiveness to states' rights
advocates. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 200-01 (describing several states' reac-
tions to Brown, including an amendment to the Louisiana state constitution to make segre-
gation permanent, Florida's complex procedures to slow desegregation, and other
outright defiance); PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 92 (quoting defiant statements of several
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as the precursor to the civil rights movement in the late '50s and early
'60s, it also hardened the resolve of many southern politicians to op-
pose civil rights legislation and to vow that white and black children
would never attend the same schools.62 . Similarly, some viewed Mi-
randa as ushering in a criminal-coddling anarchy, making the decision
an easy target for Richard Nixon in his 1968 presidential race as he
campaigned against the "Miranda Court."63 The day after the Su-
preme Court handed down the decisions in both Brown and Miranda,
the headlines in countless papers across this country seemed to imply
that a collective gasp may have fueled the public reaction to the
decisions. 64
Despite the backlash, both decisions are now integrally woven
into American political and legal culture and are hardly deemed con-
troversial. 65 This was largely because both decisions ultimately failed
state governors). With Miranda, states' rights advocates more often railed against the
Court's interference with public safety, but most of these protesters spoke on behalf of the
states. For instance, many of those who testified before Congress in the legislative effort to
overturn Miranda were state judges, legislators, state and county executives, and state pros-
ecutors. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 205. Indeed, ChiefJustice Warren even attempted to
assuage these protests in Miranda itself, when he wrote in the Miranda decision that the
case was not a "constitutional straitjacket" and that the Court encouraged "Congress and
the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
62 See MICHAELJ. K AN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPRFMF COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RActAL EQUALITY 348-60 (2004); PATIERSON, supra note 19, at 78; Ogle-
tree, supra note 8, at 10 (describing Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus and his use of the
Arkansas National Guard to prevent nine black students from enrolling in Central High
School).
63 See BAKER, 3upra note 10, at 244-49 (describing Nixon's attacks on the Supreme
Court in his presidential campaign); UROFSKY, supra note 47, at 181 (noting the critical
response to Miranda by politicians and police forces); WHITE, supra note 47, at 57.
64 Certainly the most famous image of the Brown decision is of an African-American
woman sitting on the Supreme Court steps with her arm around a young girl, holding a
newspaper with the headline "High Court Bans Segregation in Public Schools." Of course,
the aftermath of Brown, as discussed below, hardly demonstrates an outright ban of segre-
gation, but this headline very much encapsulates the reaction at the time. For other ban-
ner headlines regarding Brown, see High Court Bans School Segregation; 9-to-O Decision Grants
Time to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at Al; Pupil Segregation Banned, Ciii. Tpais., May 18,
1954, at 1; School Segregation Banned in Nation; High Court Defers Final Edict to Fall, WASH.
POsT, May 18, 1954, at 1.
With Miranda, headlines were not quite as bold, but they, nonetheless, reflect the
significance of the ruling. See, e.g., Philip Dodd, Supreme Court Rules Police Cannot Quiz Sus-
pect Without His O.K., CHI. TRIR., June 14, 1966, at 7; Fred P. Graham, High Court Puts New
Curb on Powers of the Police to Interrogate Suspects, N.Y. TimEs, June 14, 1966, at A]; High Court
Curbs Police Questioning, WASH. POST, June 14, 1966, at Al.
65 It is particularly surprising how quickly the American public adapted to Miranda
despite the dire predictions that commentators bandied immediately after the Court is-
sued its opinion. Professor Urofsky has pointed out how popular culture both reflected,
and perhaps contributed to, the acceptance of the warnings:
[I]n many ways the public quickly internalized the Miranda decision. In
1967 the old police show Dragnet was brought back to the air, and Jack
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to live up to their promise. Somewhat ironically, both decisions are
now accepted by the same individuals and institutions that were (or
would have been) fierce detractors at the time of the Court's rulings.
The American public today, even in areas of the South that were hos-
tile to Brown, by and large accepts the value of diversity, although
there is still substantial ground to cover before actually achieving it.66
While Miranda still has its critics, and arguments continue to simmer
as to the validity and scope of the Miranda doctrine, 67 most police
officers have come to appreciate its simplicity. 68 With a few magic
words and an easily obtained waiver, police today can interview sus-
pects using all of the interrogation techniques described in the police
manuals the Miranda Court decried almost forty years ago.69
For the most part, it is safe to say that American society has ac-
cepted Brown and Miranda as constitutionally mandated. But why this
acceptance, especially given the vociferous backlash each case initially
faced? It is certainly possible that America has accepted Brown and
Miranda because of their inherent correctness; that the Court got it
right in both cases, the immediate backlash just the dying gasp of the
recalcitrant. But it is more plausible that both decisions promised far
Webb as Joe Friday would give the requisite Miranda warning, although
making it clear that he considered this a hindrance to good police work. In
contrast, the star of the 1970s show, Hawaii Five-O, treated Miranda just as
Earl Warren would have wanted, as a means of making the police more
professional. Everyone in America who watched a police show on television
soon became aware of the warnings; little children playing cops-and-rob-
bers knew the words. Because giving the warning did not seem to interfere
with good police work, before long all but the most fanatic conservatives
stopped looking at -Miranda as in any way "handcuffing" the police.
UROFSKY, supra note 47, at 181; see also id. at 191 (noting that "'Warlen Court decisions such
as Brown... [and] Miranda... quickly became landmarks, and later Courts built upon
these cases as foundations, even if at times they tried to limit or refine their impact").
06 See GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF
RESEGREGATION 6 n.15 (2001) (providing statistics regarding public opinion and trends in
school segregation), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
deseg/SchoolsMoreSeparatc.pdf.
67 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449-50 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[W] hat is most remarkable about the Miranda decision-and what made it unacceptable
as a matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in the Marbusy tradition-is its
palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward what the Constitu-
tion abhors, compelled confession."); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-07 & n.1 (1985)
(refusing to apply a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis to Miranda violations and holding
that a Miranda violation creates only a bright-line presumption of coercion, not coercion
itself).
68 See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1021-22 (2001) ("By creating the opportunity for police to read sus-
pects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to obtain a signed waiver form that
signifies consensual and non-coercive interrogation, Miranda has helped the police shield
themselves from evidentiary challenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/
or involuntary confessions.").
69 See id.
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more than they actually delivered; that neither Brown nor Miranda
truly created the revolution their critics predicted.
III
NOT THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT: WHY BROWN
AND MRANDA BOTH FAILED TO LIvE UP TO
THEIR PROMISES
With respect to actually achieving school desegregation and fair-
ness in the admissibility of confessions, we can see far less progress
than one might have reasonably expected after the Court issued Brown
and Miranda. Segregation is still a painful reality in schools across
America.7 Although it no longer bears the brand of state approval
through legal recognition, segregation remains prevalent in the form
of demographic disparity. African Americans are largely concentrated
in urban and inner-city schools, while whites occupy more affluent
suburban schools. 7' Moreover, the resource disparity between these
two demographic zones reflects entrenched forms of racism. Statistics
show that while the vast majority of white schools are populated by
middle-class students, the majority of students in demographically seg-
regated black and Latino schools are poor.72 Furthermore, the effects
of poverty on education have been well established. The obvious lack
of resources, connections to schools of higher education, and teach-
ers who are willing to stay for the long term place such demographi-
cally segregated schools far behind their white, suburban
70 Indeed, school segregation has actually been growing since the late 1980s. See GARY
ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: TH- QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53-55 (1996). Harvard University's Civil Rights Project has re-
leased several recent reports tracking this trend in segregation. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKEN-
BERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING
SCHOOL DISTRICrS 4 (2002) ("[Virtually all school districts analyzed are showing lower
levels of inter-racial exposure since 1986, suggesting a trend towards resegregation, and in
some districts, these declines are sharp."), available at http://www.civilright-
sproject.harvard.edu/i-esearch/deseg/Race inAmerican-Public-Schoolsl.pdf; SEAN F.
REARDON & JOHN T. YUN, PRIVATE SCHOOL RACIAL ENROLLMENTS AND SEGREGATION 3-7
(2002) (analyzing data that reveal widespread segregation among private schools), available
at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Private-Schools.pdf; see also
ORFIELD, supra note 66, at 17-19 (providing empirical evidence showing a trend toward
resegregation in the United States).
71 See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 70, at 55 ("A student in an intensely segregated
African American and Latino school was fourteen times more likely to be in a high-poverty
school (more than 50 percent poor) than a student in a school that was more than 90
percent white.").
72 See id.; see also FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 70, at 22 ("The isolation of blacks
and Latinos has serious ramifications: this isolation is highly correlated with poverty, which
is often strongly related to striking inequalities in test scores, graduation rates, courses
offered and college-going rates."); ORFIELD, supra note 66, at 10 ("[H]ighly segregated
black and/or Latino schools are many times more likely than segregated white schools to
experience concentration of poverty. This is the legacy of unequal education, income, and
the continuing patterns of housing discrimination.").
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counterparts. 73 And the number of minority students in these demo-
graphically segregated schools is escalating, rather than decreasing.7 4
In fact, while America certainly made some progress reversing some of
the entrenched, institutional forms of segregation in the 1960s and
early 1970s, we slipped back toward the status quo ante in the late
1980s and 1990s.7 5 So, if the measure of Brown's success is whether
integration has been achieved, it failed.76
Judged by its practical effects, Miranda was no less a failure. The
vast majority of suspects submit to police interrogation 77 and the same
police interrogation manuals still teach officers how to conduct the
same psychologically coercive interrogation techniques. 78 In many
ways, Miranda has made matters worse for criminal suspects. For ex-
ample, a police officer who uses these interrogation techniques today
can easily justify them with a requisite warning and waiver, effectively
disabling the suspect from arguing in a later proceeding that his or
her statement was involuntary. 79 New DNA technology has exoner-
73 See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 70, at 53-54.
74 See id. at 54-55; see also FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 70, at 4-5; ORFIELD, Supra
note 66, at 31-34 (discussing national resegregation trends).
75 See ORFIELD, supra note 66, at 2 ("From 1988 to 1998, most of the progress of the
previous two decades in increasing integration in the [South] was lost. The South is still
much more integrated than it was before the civil rights revolution, but it is moving back-
ward at an accelerating rate.").
76 Indeed, in the wake of Brown's fiftieth anniversary, a number of commentators,
both in academia and in the press, have lamented Brown's failure truly to bring about
desegregation in America's public school system. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, American Pub-
lic Schools Fifty Years After Brown: A Separate and Unequal Reality, 47 How. L.J. 341, 351-60
(2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM.
U. L. REv. 1461, 1463-68 (2003); Richard Thompson Ford, Brown s Ghost, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 1305, 1311-17 (2004); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education:
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1341 (2004); Derrick Bell,
50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education: The Failed Legacy of Boston School Desegregation,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2004, at Ell; William Douglas, Campaign Focuses on Racial Issues;
Bush, Kerry Address Shortcomings 50 Years After Historic Brown Case, HOUSTON CHRON., May
18, 2004, at A3; Tracy Jan & Bill Graves, 50 Years Later, But Still Not Equal, OREGONIAN, May
16, 2004, at Bi; Chris Moran, Not Separate, Yet Unequal, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., May 16,
2004, at Al; Leslie Postal & Dave Weber, Achievement Gap' Vexes Schools: Black Students-and
Hispanics-Lag Behind White Classmates, ORLANOO SENTINEL, May 16, 2004, at Al; Jason
Spencer, Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years Later, HOUSTON CHRON., May 16, 2004, at
Al; Baye Betty Winston, Fifty Years Later, Integration Still Remains a Person-By-Person Challenge,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 20, 2004, at A8.
77 See Leo, supra note 68, at 1012-13 (revealing that "the overwhelming majority of
suspects (some 78% to 96%) waive their rights").
78 See Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and
Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. Rev. 662, 663 (1986) (reviewing the latest edition of
the widely used police manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS (3d ed. 1986), and finding that "the author's suggested interrogation tactics, even if
refined and rearranged, have remained largely the same" as those in the editions pub-
lished in 1962 and 1967); Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interroga-
tion Practices, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1211, 1235 (2001).
79 See Leo, supra note 68, at 1015, 1021-22.
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ated many convicted persons and, in the course of doing so, has
demonstrated that a number of confessions produced by an inher-
ently coercive environment of police-dominated interrogation are
false.8 0 Moreover, it turns out (surprise!) that most suspects cannot
call a private lawyer out of the blue, and most are reluctant to put
their trust in a stranger appointed by the court. By virtually any mea-
sure, Miranda would have been far more effective in policing against
involuntary confessions and abusive interrogation practices if it had
banned the interrogation techniques themselves, required the pres-
ence of an attorney (or neutral observer), or better yet, required that
police interrogations be taped.8 1
Why Brown and Miranda have been such failures is open to de-
bate. Commentators frequently point to the fact that both decisions
suffered at the hands of subsequent Supreme CourtJustices who were
appointed specifically to weaken or overrule these prime examples of
judicial activism.8 2 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts were largely ap-
pointed by conservative presidents who were elected in part to rein in
the activist Court. Numerous cases support this argument. The
Court's decisions in Milliken v. Bradley,8 3 Pasadena City Board of Educa-
tion v. Spangler,8 4 and Board of Education v. DoweUl85 certainly took some
of the wind out of Brown's sails. 86 Similarly, the Court certainly lim-
ited Miranda's protections in cases such as New York v. Quarles,8 7
80 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to
Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENv. U. L. Rav. 1135,
1137-39 n.12 (1997) (providing an extensive list of sources that discuss case examples of
false confessions).
81 At present, only Alaska and Minnesota require by law the taping of police interro-
gations. SeeState v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (mandating the recording of
all custodial interrogations in Minnesota); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska
1985) (holding that an unexcused failure to record a police interrogation violates a sus-
pect's due process rights under the Alaska constitution). Several police departments in the
southern region of Florida, however, have begun voluntarily taping interrogations, and
some see this initiative as a possible growing trend. See Michael McGuire, Taped Police Inter-
rogations Gain Momentum in Florida, CHi. TIUB., Mar. 8, 2003, at 1.
82 See, e.g., WHITF, supra note 47, at 60-61 (noting hostility toward Miranda among
members of the Burger Court). But see PAYTERSON, supra note 19, at 147-69 (noting the
Burger Court's surprising support of post-Brown desegregation cases).
83 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding that a court may not order a multidistrict
desegregation plan unless it finds that district boundary lines were established for the pur-
pose of segregation).
84 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (holding that the district court exceeded its authority
by requiring annual readjustment of assignment zones to ensure no school had a majority
of minority students where failures to comply with provisions were the result of population
pattern shifts).
85 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (allowing dissolution of desegregation decree where dis-
crimination had been pratically eliminated).
86 See PAIrERSON, supra note 19, at 177-83.
87 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (creating "public safety" exception to Miranda warnings).
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Rhode Island v. Innis,88 Oregon v. Elstad,8 9 and Davis v. United States,90
as well as in several more recent decisions.('
But the subsequent erosion of Brown and Miranda was not the
result of a bizarre twist of history. Rather, both decisions themselves
allowed states to easily circumvent goals that the Court had in mind.
First, as previously noted, Brown IIs "all deliberate speed" standard9 2
created incentives for states to drag their feet in integrating schools.9 -3
Essentially, the Court only went so far as to identify a wrong, but de-
clined to mandate a rapid redress-or even cessation of-the injury.
In this respect, Brown still has no parallel, and the Court's lack of vigi-
lance in monitoring the progress of desegregation, 94 combined with
its vague standard of "all deliberate speed," planted the seeds for
Brown's failure.
Second, one could argue that the heart of the matter in Brown
was never really just feelings of inferiority, but disparate resource allo-
88 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (holding that words or actions reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response are forms of interrogation, but not applying this definition to an
instance in which police voiced concern about the safety of children who might stumble
upon the defendant's weapon).
89 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (ruling that "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis does not
apply to Mianda violations).
90 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (holding that requests for cotnsel must be unequivocal in
order to require a halt to interrogation).
91 The Court bolstered Miranda in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2601
(2004), or at least rejected the constitutional validity of many transparent attempts to cir-
cumvent Miranda, by holding that police officers cannot intentionally refuse to provide
Miranda warnings, interrogate the suspect, obtain an incriminating statement, and then
administer Miranda warnings and secure a waiver in order to "re-obtain" the confession.
See id. at 2611 ("[W]hen Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and
continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and 'deprive a defendant of knowledge
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of aban-
doning them."' (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986))). But, what the
Court giveth the Court can taketh away. On the same day, the Court ruled in United States
v. Patane, 542 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004), that physical evidence found as the result of
information provided by a suspect in violation of Miranda is admissible. See id. at 2629.
Patane also erased any doubts as to whether Dickerson might have overturned prior Court
rulings that "fitit of the poisonous tree" analysis would not apply to Miranda. See, e.g.,
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307-08. The Court also chipped away at Miranda's effectiveness in Yar-
borough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004), where it held that a state court's
failure to consider the age of the suspect in determining whether the individual was in
custody (thus, triggering the Miranda safeguards) was not an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. See Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2150.
92 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1I), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
93 See ELLIS COSE, BEYOND BROWN V. BoARD: THE FINAL BArTF FOR EXCELLENCE IN
A.MERICAN EDUCATION 8-10 (2004) ("All deliberate speed, as we now know, was seen by the
South as an invitation to stall and gave opportunistic politicians a chance to mobilize
against the very notion of integration."); Ogletree, supra note 8, at 10 ("Even though the
Court's ruling was unanimous, its reluctance to take a more forceful position on ending
segregation immediately played into the hands of the integration opponents.").
94 See Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation: The Dissolution of a
Well-Intentioned Mandate, 79 MARQ. L. Rav. 347, 357-62 (1995) (discussing the Court's re-
treat in mandating school desegregation and some of the possible reasons for it).
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cation. Putting aside the much-criticized scientific studies before the
Court in Brown,9 5 one could question why the Court concluded that
feelings of inferiority among minority children would so consistently
stem from legally segregated schools that they declared to be "inher-
ently unequal." 6 Widespread discrimination in resource allocation
undoubtedly contributed to such feelings of inferiority and appeared
to be a more important factor in generating those feelings than was
the fact that black children did not sit next to white children. Never-
theless, the Court largely left issues of unequal resource allocation to
the states.9 7 As one might expect, offending states hardly took the
initiative, and thus much of the progress states were forced to make
soon after Brown has receded. Why the Court chose not to address
general discrimination is not clear, but the Court likely did not ever
believe that segregation was always wrong.
Alternatively, the Court could have concluded that it was the fact
of segregation-not proof of its purposeful, state-sanctioned origins-
that created inferior feelings and opportunities. The focus on the
state of mind of state actors proved to be the death knell for true
integration. Brown proved to be woefully ineffective in combating
demographic, de facto forms of segregation, which are still as preva-
lent as ever.98 Indeed, one recent landmark case regarding the dis-
parity of resource allocation in Connecticut schools was decided
purely on state-law grounds, because under the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution was powerless to
prohibit de facto segregation.9 9
Miranda can be analyzed in the same manner. The Court cer-
tainly expressed grave reservations about the fairness of psychological
intimidation in police interrogations,'0 0 but the Court held that all
such techniques were permissible as long as there was an explanation
of rights and a valid waiver from the suspect.' 0l In other words, the
police officers who were responsible for violating suspects' rights in
interrogation rooms could justify the use of the techniques by reading
')," See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
96 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added).
97 Indeed, the Court ultimately ruled that equal resource allocation was not a consti-
tutional right. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973).
98 See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
99 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Conn. 1996) ("The public elementary
and high school students in Hartford suffer daily from the devastating effects that racial
and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty, have had on their education. Federal constitu-
tional law provides no remedy for their plight.").
100 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446-48 (1966) (discussing the Court's con-
cerns with modern, psychological tactics in police interrogations and stating that "[u] nless
a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved... there can be no assurance
that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future").
101 See id. at 478-79.
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the suspect the four basic rights and declaring that he waived them.
Rather than directly banning the shady interrogation techniques, or
requiring that someone other than the police explain the rights to the
suspect, the Court's procedures give an appearance of fairness rather
than mandating it.102
So in both cases, the Court began with an expansive view of the
Framers' intent, only to create very narrow remedies. Why did the
Court fall so short? Perhaps it was practical: the Court just did not
have the political capital to truly change the practices of the country's
school boards and police officers. Maybe Brown and Miranda were the
best the Court could do under the circumstances, and the subsequent
backlash 10 3 and conservative Court packing' 0 4 demonstrated that the
Court really had pushed the envelope as far as it could. If the Court
had gone any further it is arguable that there would have been a con-
stitutional crisis in the making-though it could also be argued that it
would have been a crisis worth enduring.
Perhaps the Court was overly optimistic in reading the winds of
change. It may have felt that the time for change was right, its inter-
pretation of the Constitution was sound, and with just a little nudge,
Congress and the states would soon follow its lead. Indeed, both
Brown and Miranda extended an invitation for Congress and the states
to take the constitutional ball and run with it by enacting more effec-
tive legislation to eliminate segregation and reduce involuntary con-
fessions. 10 5 Maybe the Court intended Brown and Miranda only as first
steps. Unfortunately, the wind direction shifted quite rapidly in both
cases, and the weak attempt by the Court to forge revolutionary
change in constitutional doctrine turned out to be a flash in the
pan. 1 0 6
102 For a vivid description of just how useless the Miranda procedures are according to
the very officers who are responsible for executing these procedures, see UVILLER, supra
note 49, at 208-12.
103 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
105 Both Brown and Miranda seemed to invite other actors to play a part in effectuating
thejudgments. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490 (1966) ("Congress and the States are free
to develop their own safeguards for the privilege [against self-incrimination], so long as
they are fully... effective... in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it."); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349
U.S, 294, 300 (1955) (holding that lower courts, in applying the Brown decision, should
apply equitable principles that facilitate "adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs" and allow elimination of school segregation in accord with the public interest in "a
systematic and effective manner").
106 Ultimately, Congress did react in both cases. With respect to Brown, Congress fi-
nally stepped in with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which attempted to "put some
teeth into enforcement of desegregation." United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836, 849 (5th Cir. 1966). With respect to Miranda, Congress attempted to over-
rule the decision by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which was largely forgotten until the Court
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Despair over the false promises of Brown and Miranda is appropri-
ate, but it should not be overdone. Both cases had and still maintain
tremendous symbolic importance in their assertions that certain types
of conduct will not be tolerated. 10 7 Moreover, Brown may have in-
spired more than it accomplished, as many observers have credited
the decision with ushering in a new and powerful wave of civil rights
activism in the 1960s and 1970s.108
IV
OTHER PARALLELS
Parallels between Brown and Miranda exist in other decisions that
generally fall within the Warren Court era. One example is Furman v.
Georgia,10 9 where the Court ruled that the death penalty, as then ad-
ministered by all states with capital punishment, violated the Eighth
Amendment. 110 Though the Court issued the Furman decision after
overturned the statute 30 years later in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435-37,
443-44 (2000).
107 Indeed, several scholars have praised Brown's simple appeal for racial equality. Pro-
fessor Dennis Hutchinson has referred to the decision as "a moral prayer." Richard Brust,
The Court Comes Together, 90 ABA J. 40, 44 (2004). Similarly, Professor Mark Tushnet has
stated that Brown "was a statement about the moral imperative of racial equality, issued by
one of the premier institutions when no one else would do it." Id. Professor Ogletree has
noted how Brown was the beginning of decades of litigation to fight segregation in many
institutions. See Ogletree, supra note 8, at 10-1i.
Scholars have also offered at least some praise for Miranda's attempt to restrain police
abuses. See, e.g., MILTON MELTZER, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 96 (1972) ("With all its
limitations, Miranda placed against the policeman's inevitable temptation to excess an op-
posing pressure to resist that temptation. The police are more likely to respect the law if it
is made plain that the larger society demands it."). Others have similarly praised Miranda
as a powerful, albeit flawed, symbol of the Fifth Amendment's protections for even the
lowliest criminals in society. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 1417, 1471 (1985) (
For its supporters, Miranda is a gesture of government's willingness to treat
the lowliest antagonist as worthy of respect and consideration. They have a
point. There is something attractive about a legal system that insists that
suspects have a right to refuse to answer police inquiries, that imposes on
the police an obligation to communicate that right, and that provides coun-
sel to the indigent. The fifth amendment, as much as any constitutional
provision, illustrates that ours is a limited government.
); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VANn. L, REv. 1, 21
(1986) ("Miranda's symbolic value not only has produced a better atmosphere for people
who come in contact with the police but also may have made a tangible contribution to-
ward curbing abusive police practices.").
108 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 116 ("[Brown] destroyed the edifice of legitimacy
upon which Plessy had placed segregation, laid the foundation for the civil rights move-
ment, and revolutionized the notions of what courts, lawyers, and the law might do to
expand racial justice."). For an excellent description of how the civil rights movement
unfolded in South Carolina following the Brown decision, see John Monk, No Longer Sepa-
rate, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 16, 2004, at S1.
109 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
110 Id. at 240.
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Chief Justice Warren retired, it is often considered-correctly in our
view-one of the final decisions of the Warren Court. After all, it was
the Warren Court's queasiness about capital punishment and the de
facto moratorium on executions which resulted from its "flip-flop-
ping" on the issue that produced Furman."'
Most of the Brown/Miranda parallels make an appearance in
Furman, albeit less conspicuously. As in Brown and Miranda, Furman
was a clear case of a well-defined legal strategy designed by the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 1 2 Furman also involved consolidated
cases that shared a constitutional question. 1 3 The majority of the
Court read the Constitution expansively, interpreting the Eighth
Amendment as encompassing procedural application of criminal laws,
as opposed to merely their facial content." 4 The Court in Furman was
11 Furman grew out of increasing criticism of the death penalty as applied in the
states, which began in the Warren Court era. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101
(1958) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the "forceful" arguments against the death pen-
alty and holding that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); see also LAzxauS, supra
note 10, at 86-90 (detailing the early indications in the 1960s, particularly by Justice
Goldberg, that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment). Later in the Warren
Court era, the Witherspoon v. Illinois decision formed a significant landmark in the LDF's
fight against the death penalty. See 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968) (striking down the state
practice of dismissing for cause capital jurors "simply because they voiced general objec-
tions to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its inflic-
tion"); GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 446-47 (noting the LDF's role in the case). Finally, a
Warren Court case that cotld very well have had the same effect as Furman-Maxwell v.
Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per curiam), wound up being delayed and ultimately dis-
pensed with a per curiam opinion based on Witherspoon. See LAZARUS, supra note 10, at
99-101; WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from
the Court, 100 HARV. L. REx'. 313, 316-18 (1986); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, TiHE UNPUB-
LISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 394-443 (1985) (discussing the history of the
Maxwell case in the Supreme Court and reprinting key documents).
112 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 440-52 (discussing the LDF's role in fighting the
death penalty); LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 104-10 (chronicling the history of the Furman
decision and the LDF's involvement). See generally MICHAEL MELTSNFR, CRUFl AND UNU-
SUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1974) (providing a thorough history
of the LDF's role in fighting the death penalty).
113 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
114 See id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The high service rendered by the 'cruel
and unusual' punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is ... to require judges to see
to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular
groups."); id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he State does not respect human dig-
nity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does
not inflict upon others .... [T]he very words 'cruel and unusual punishments' imply
condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments."); id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of
a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed."); id. at 314 (White,J., concurring) ("Legislative 'policy' is ...
necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by whatjuries and judges do
in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them."); id. at 364-66 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (highlighting the discriminatory application of the death penalty as an ad-
ditional justification for holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment).
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heavily influenced by the disparate imposition of the death penalty
against the poor and racial minorities," 15 and the decision can be seen
as part of the Court's attempt to dismantle institutional racism. 1 6 Va-
rious Justices also justified their conclusions based on social science
research.' 17
Like Brown and Miranda, Furman caused a vociferous backlash." 8
The Court's lack of consensus as to the legitimacy of the death penalty
encouraged states to pass capital punishment statutes that conformed
with Furman's vague mandate. " 9 Furman, like Brown and Miranda, was
also a failure. The death penalty has not become fairer, and racism is
still rampant in its application.1 20 Why? Because, as with Brown and
115 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 450-51 (examining how the arbitrary application
of the death penalty was the "central vice" that the Court recognized); LAZARUS, suptra note
10, at 107-08 (discussing the Court's concerns over discretionary application of the death
penalty, as expressed by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White); MELTSNER, supra note 112,
at 295-96 (same).
116 See GREENBERG, supra note 10, at 440-50. Professor Greenberg discusses the history
leading up to Furman and the indications that the Court was increasingly wary of the death
penalty as an institution. Justice Goldberg's dissent to a denial of certiorari of a capital
case in 1963 served as a strong indication to the LDF that the Court had some concerns
about capital punishment. See id. at 441. Professor Greenberg also notes an "anti-capital
punishment mood" among the Court in the early 1970s. See id. at 449. Eliminating the
death penalty was also very much a personal crusade of Justice Marshall. See BOB WOOD-
WARD & ScorT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 241-51 (1979).
117 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 250-51 & n.15 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing and
discussing several studies of the death penalty); id. at 351-52 & nn.112-17 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing and relying on numerous criminology studies regarding the effective-
ness of the death penalty).
118 SeeGREENBERG, supra note 10, at 451-52 (noting the sharp rise in public support for
the death penalty following Furman and the states' efforts to restore the death penalty with
standards that would conform to Furman's mandate); LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 111-12;
MELTSNER, supra notc 112, at 306--09.
119 Professor Edward Lazarus has claimed that Furman failed largely because the deci-
sion was rendered with little coherence or clarity:
Furman's failure was as much institutional as intellectual. For fiveJustices to
issue one of the most far-reaching constitutional rulings in the Court's his-
tory without even agreeing among themselves on a legal rationale betrayed
the very rule of law they claimed to be upholding. That rule depends on a
shared language of principle, a common understanding of where the law
has been, where the law should go, and how to travel the distance between.
It depends on continuity, a sensible accounting of how long-standing ap-
peals compel contemporary conclusions.
Furman contains none of this: no communal judgment,.., no effort to take
into account the profound changes in both public attitudes and the Court's
own composition. Instead, fivejustices abandoned the Court's institutional
responsibility to justify and give coherence to a dramatic shift in the law.
LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 109.
120 SeeJohn H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases,
83 CORNELL L. REv. 1771, 1774-75 (1998) [hereinafter Blume, Post-McCleskey];John H.
Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the "Modern"
Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 285, 306-09 (2002); see alsoJohn
Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUn. 165, 167 (2004) (discussing the "race-of-victim" effect, which demonstrates signifi-
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Miranda, the Court only went "so far." The Court did not say that it
was impossible to have a nondiscriminatory death penalty. It did not
say that it is never necessary to have a death penalty. In failing to
declare the death penalty to be per se cruel and unusual l2 or inevita-
bly discriminatory in a racially divided society, the Court's decision
carried the seeds of its failure. As a result, states soon retooled and
figured out a way around the ruling, setting up capital punishment
procedures that looked formally more structured than those invali-
dated by the Furman Court.12 2 Subsequent evidence, however, has
demonstrated that these procedures were not productive in eliminat-
ing racially discriminatory results. 123 While proof of racially disparate
distribution of death sentences exists, as in the case of proof of de
facto segregation, it is not enough to affect litigation. Fifteen years
after Furman, the Court in McCleskey held that only when an individual
defendant establishes discriminatory purpose does the Equal Protec-
tion Clause speak to racial disparities in capital sentencing.12 4 Yet,
this proof of individualized discriminatory purpose is very hard to
come by. 12 5 In fact, cultural changes, spurred in part by Brown, have
made such proof virtually impossible to obtain since racial discrimina-
tion has become socially unacceptable and, therefore, much more
covert.
CONCLUSION
The parallels between Brown and Miranda-and Furman, too-
demonstrate both the bold judicial activism of the Warren Court era,
as well as its ultimate failure to bring about real change in key areas of
our society. Nevertheless, these decisions present ideals worth striving
for, even if the courts ultimately proved inadequate in realizing them.
canly higher death penalty rates for black defendant-white victim cases than black defen-
dant-black victim cases).
121 Indeed, only Justices Brennan and Marshall went so far as to hold that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional. See Furman, 409 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[D]eath is today a 'cruel and unusual' punishment."); id. at 358-59 (Marshall,j., concur-
ring) ("[T]he death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the
Eighth Amendment."). The other three who formed the majority based their concur-
rences on the arbitrary nature of the death penalty as applied. See, e.g., id. at 310-11
(White, J., concurring) ("I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional
per se."). For a synopsis of how the concurring opinions broke down, see MELTSNER, supra
note 112, at 293-96.
122 See supra note 118.
123 See supra note 120.
124 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 297-99 (1987). This is especially the
case following the Court's ruling in McClesky, which lower courts have widely interpreted to
mean that statistical evidence of systemic racism are irrelevant in determining the constitu-
tionality of a state's death penalty system. See Blume, Post-McCleskey, supra note 120, at
1780-98 (discussing several post-McCleskey cases).
125 See id. at 1794-98.
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Despite promise of revolution and upheaval, we are in many ways still
stuck in the past, with a long, hard road left to travel if the initial
promises of Brown, Miranda, and Furman are to be realized.
As Willie Stark, the great politician of All the Kings Men, said on
his deathbed: "'It might have been all different, Jack. You got to be-
lieve that." ' 126 It is worth considering how things might have been
different had the Warren Court taken a different approach with re-
spect to racism in the United States. In Brown, the Court could have
said that the only way to true equality is by sharing lives, and that
whenever-and however-racial majorities segregate a racial minor-
ity, inequality is always the result. The Court, however, on the other
hand, could have cut to the heart of inequality-different access to
opportunities and resources. In Miranda, the Court could have held
that some neutral party, such as ajudge, must explain to every suspect
his or her rights, 2 7 or the Court could have required the taping of all
interrogations. Any of these steps would have been far closer to end-
ing the violations that the Court decried. Finally, in Furman, the
Court could have taken the best approach possible, which is to say that
in a country with the racial history of the United States, one cannot
have a death penalty and expect that it will not be discriminatory.
It might have been all different, and many of us wait for and be-
lieve in the day that it will be.
126 ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN 436 (Second Harvest ed. 1996) (Jack
Burden quoting Willie Stark as he died).
127 Indeed, the Petitioner argued for a ruling that counsel must be available for all
interrogations. See Brief for Petitioner at 11-26, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(No. 759).
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